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and inform each other in multiple ways, and 
how the connections can be modulated and 
are flexible in different contexts.
We approach these connections of 
internal representation through models of 
minimal cognitive systems in a bottom-up 
approach (Schilling and Cruse, submitted; 
Schilling and Cruse, 2008). An early neural 
network model of the own body is grounded 
in a biological-inspired framework that con-
trols walking in a hexapod robot. While this 
internal model is very simple, it is quite flex-
ible and can be recruited in service for multi-
ple functions (Schilling, 2011). Importantly, 
the predictive capabilities of the body model 
allow applying the model in internal simu-
lation. In internal simulation alternative 
possible behaviors can be tried out and the 
predicted consequences can be evaluated 
without actually carrying out probably 
dangerous behaviors (Hesslow, 2002). The 
system can plan ahead and becomes cogni-
tive in the sense of McFarland and Bösser 
(1993). Interestingly, the behavioral system, 
which allows variation of existing or crea-
tion of new behaviors, implements a form of 
unified neuronal workspace (Dehaene and 
Naccache, 2001; on a more abstract level this 
might be termed a global workspace follow-
ing; Baars and Franklin, 2007). In this global 
workspace, behavioral elements can be 
accessed (and possibly varied) in new con-
texts in order to find a (new) solution to an 
actual problem. The decisions of the system 
are not directly triggered by sensory input 
and are not predictable from outside. Instead 
action selection occurs at various levels of 
complexity. We argue that such a system 
shows properties of what has been termed 
access consciousness by Cleeremans (2005; 
which is distinguished from metacognition 
and phenomenological consciousness). 
Access consciousness refers to the ability of 
A commentary on
Whatever next? Predictive brains, situated 
agents, and the future of cognitive science
by Clark, A. (in press). Behav. Brain Sci.
What’s next? – To know what comes next 
is already important in carrying out action 
and allows us to make fast movements. We 
use predictions in control of our own move-
ments and to anticipate what is going on 
around us.
Clark’s (in press) perspective is pushing 
the importance of prediction even further. 
Predictions are the “language” in between 
different representations: levels of represen-
tation do not communicate by exchanging 
state information, instead the information 
flow is lazy and one level is telling the other 
only what that does not know – or would 
not predict or expect.
While we value Clark’s thoughts on the 
hierarchical prediction machine approach 
and its implications, one important require-
ment is not addressed: the connections 
between different levels of representations 
are not only not arbitrary, but it appears 
that these can be flexibly utilized and in 
this way different combinations of inter-
connected – predicting – layers can serve 
diverse purposes.
To illustrate, we put this issue into the 
viewpoint of representations, central to 
which functional internal models are. We 
agree with Clark that these internal models 
have to be predictive. But there may be more 
to them then only prediction. First of all, 
engaged (and maybe grounded as sensori-
motor circuits) internal models may serve an 
inverse function in motor control, i.e., com-
ing up with motor control commands when 
given a certain goal. Secondly, as animals and 
humans have a wide variety of redundant 
sensors, such internal models should exploit 
the redundancy and integrate the noisy con-
tributions of multiple sensors.
As we know today, such internal models 
are not only serving one single function, 
but internal models are recruited in service 
for diverse function (Anderson, 2010), e.g., 
perception, to understand the actions per-
formed by somebody else, or in planning 
ahead. The internal models are recruited in 
an internal simulation (Hesslow, 2002) – 
and central is their predictive function: in 
planning ahead they are used to simulate 
possible consequences of actions and then to 
choose only a suitable one. In understanding 
someone’s else actions they are driven by an 
unfolding action and start to resonate with 
the action, at the same time also invoking 
representations related to this action, e.g., 
on a higher level something like a goal or 
guiding perception on a lower level. While 
prediction is essential to internal models, 
it is the flexible use and the way in which 
levels can be combined and inform each 
other that makes this a powerful tool serving 
many functions [up to language, as shown, 
e.g., by Ramscar et al. (2010)]. This flow of 
predictive information in between levels 
(top-down and bottom-up) of representa-
tion depends on both: on the one hand, on 
the capability to activate connected levels 
of representation (e.g., attention), but on 
the other hand, also to decouple levels of 
representation (for example, in planning 
ahead it is important that the body itself is 
decoupled from the planning process, but 
we can plan on different levels and switch 
between these levels). These mechanisms are 
left out in Clark’s approach and should be 
specified next. Yet, if we would like to scale a 
model up to symbolic representations such 
as language, we need to understand how 
connected levels of representation are linked 
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a system to plan and guide actions, to reason 
and to report verbally on the content of the 
corresponding representations. Such acces-
sible states are required to guide the action 
variation process during internal simula-
tion. They emerge in such a system lead-
ing to networks of interconnected higher 
level representations which are at the same 
time grounded, but not directly accessible, 
lower level sensorimotor representations. 
Competitive activation of representational 
units leads to an attention-like focus. From 
our point of view, it is interesting how such 
simple neural network based models show 
such high-level properties and connect to 
philosophical accounts1. Even though inter-
nal models are central to this approach, it 
is their flexibility which makes the system 
cognitive. Internal simulation becomes cru-
cial, as the decoupled use of internal mod-
els in internal simulation suddenly allows 
evaluating alternative actions. This intro-
duces an internal competition of alternative 
behaviors and varying existing behaviors or 
coming up with new behaviors (even risky 
ones) becomes now valuable. The concur-
rent activation of such behaviors leads, first, 
to action selection. And second, a form of 
attention as a focus on this behavior emerges 
and the behavior has to be evaluated. The 
unfolding behavior has to be related to the 
agent’s motivations or, on a higher level, 
goals. Prediction is the key to, first, allow 
for planning ahead as internal simulation 
and choosing novel behaviors only based 
on estimated consequences. Second, this 
might serve as a starting point for a higher 
level organization of accessible and attended 
internal states.
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1Which currently guides future research as we are spe-
cifically addressing two topics: first, connecting high 
level (“consciously aware”) states and use information 
in a simple communication which allows the system to 
utter its current state or through which the process of 
internal simulation can be guided externally. Second, 
with respect to metacognition, internal simulation 
provides a starting point for a theory of mind.
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